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Great Britain. Lords,
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THE LORDS PROTEST,

February 3. 1740-1.

LONDON:

Printed in the Year MDCCXLI.

THE

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PROTEST,

BRITISH MUSEUM

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Die Martis, 3. Februarii, 1740-1.

THE Order of the Day being read, for taking into Conſideration the ſeveral Eſtimates of the Charge of the Guards, Garriſons and other Land-forces in the Plantations, *Minorca* and *Gibraltar*, and the Charge of ſeven Regiments of Foot and four Regiments of Marines to be raiſed for the Year 1741, laid before this Houſe the 19th of *January* laſt,

It was moved to reſolve, That an humble Addreſs be preſented to his Majeſty, humbly repreſenting to his Majeſty, That this Houſe cannot conceive, the intended Augmentation of Land-forces to be neceſſary, either from the preſent Situation of Affairs in *Europe*, or from any Lights they have received, ſuch as have always been thought neceſſary by our Anceſtors to juſtify the laying any extraordinary Burthens on the Subjects; and moſt humbly to beſeech his Majeſty, that if he ſhould however think ſo great an Augmentation abſolutely neceſſary, he will at leaſt be graciouſly pleaſed (as well for the preſent, as for the

future Eaſe of his Subjects) to order it to be made in the moſt frugal manner, by ſuch an Addition of private Men to the preſent Regiments as his Majeſty, from his own Wiſdom, and Knowledge of the Practice of moſt other Countries, ſhall judge to be moſt proper for Military Service, and leaſt dangerous to this Conſtitution.

Which being objected to,

After long Debate thereupon,

The Queſtion was put, Whether ſuch an Addreſs ſhall be preſented to his Majeſty?

It was reſolved in the Negative:

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Diſſentient

1. Becauſe we conceive, that nothing leſs than an evident and abſolute Neceſſity ſhould prevail with us, to conſent to any Augmentation of our Land-forces, which, in our Opinions, are at preſent fully ſufficient for any good Purpoſes either abroad or at home, being very near equal to the higheſt Eſtabliſhment during the whole Courſe of the laſt general War. The national Troops now ſubſiſting (excluſive of thoſe in *Ireland*) amount to 51,515 effective Men; whereas our greateſt Number of national Troops in the laſt War, was but 67,000

67,000 Men, including the Non-effectives; which, reduced to the Foot of our preſent Eſtabliſhment, makes but 57,000 effective Men: And the preſent intended Augmentation of 10,325 Men, is ſuch an exceeding, as can only be authoriſed by the like publick Dangers; which Dangers not appearing to us, either from the Debate, or from any Information we have obtained, we are unwilling to truſt more Force in the Hands of an Adminiſtration, which (as far as we are able to recollect) have not hitherto employed any they have been ſo truſted with, to the Honour or Advantage of the Nation. Extraordinary Truſt and Confidence ought, as we apprehend, only to be placed in ſuch, who, by the Experience of their paſt Conduct, have juſtly eſtabliſhed their Credit, and intitled themſelves to be ſo truſted: But when we look back upon the ſeveral Augmentations within theſe laſt 20 Years, demanded and granted upon Cauſes more ſtrongly aſſerted than clearly proved, but viſibly without any good End ever attained; and particularly, when we reflect, that by a moſt unaccountable Fluctuation and Contrariety of Meaſures, a very great Augmentation was made in the Year 1727, to act in Conjunction with *France* againſt the Houſe of *Auſtria*, for whoſe Defence the preſent Augmentation is ſaid to be principally intended;

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we thought it our Duty to endeavour to prevent any unneceſſary Increaſe of our Land-forces, not being influenced either by the pretended Apprehenſions, or real Fears of an Adminiſtration, the boldeſt in domeſtick, but, as we apprehend, the moſt puſillanimous in foreign Tranſactions.

2. Becauſe we conceive, that Dangers alledged from Diſaffection at home, are in a great meaſure groundleſs, no Symptoms of ſuch Diſaffection having appeared for many Years, and the Principles upon which it was formerly grounded being almoſt univerſally worn out and exploded. And we think it highly neceſſary, to diſtinguiſh between a Diſſatisfaction ariſing only from the Conduct of the Adminiſtration, and a Diſaffection to his Majeſty and his Royal Family, though ſome may deſire to blend them: For, had the preſent general Diſſatisfaction at the inglorious, the burthenſome Meaſures of the Adminiſtration, been, in truth, Diſaffection to his Majeſty, as has been often falſely ſuggeſted by thoſe who deſire to confound his Cauſe with their own, twice the Number of Troops now propoſed, would not be ſufficient to ſecure the Peace of the Kingdom; but, on the contrary, we are perſuaded, that the Duty and Loyalty of the Nation to his Majeſty and his Royal Family, and their Hopes from his Virtues, have check-

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ed and kept the Diſſatisfaction againſt the Adminiſtration within the due Bounds of Concern and Lamentation.

3. Becauſe, conſidering the Advantage of our Situation as an Iſland, and our Superiority at Sea, it is impoſſible for us to think ourſelves in any Danger of an Invaſion from *Spain*, even if theſe Fleets were now in their Ports, which we ſuffered them to ſend to *America*; nor can we conceive, that about 28,000 effective Men now actually in this Kingdom, with all the Advantages of Horſe and Artillery, is not Force ſufficient to ſecure us from any Body of Foot, that any other Power could poſſibly land on our Coaſts by Surpriſe: And as for any great Imbarkation, it neither can be made on a ſudden, nor in ſecret; we muſt have timely notice to provide ſuperior Fleets, (which, in ſuch a Caſe, we preſume, would be allowed to act,) to ſtrengthen our own Corps, and render ſuch an Attempt wholly impracticable. In which Opinion we are the more confirmed, becauſe that in the moſt glorious Year of the laſt War, when the Duke of *Marlborough* and his Army were in the middle of *Germany*, out of reach of giving us any Aſſiſtance at home, it was not thought neceſſary, by the wiſe Adminiſtration of that time, to keep above 9000 Men in this Iſland for our Defence againſt *France*, then irritated by our Succeſſes: And ſurely three

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times that Number muſt be now abundantly ſufficient, unleſs more are wanted for Purpoſes not thought of by former Adminiſtrations, nor yet openly avowed by this.

4. Becauſe, whatever Demands may be made upon us by our Allies, on the Continent, we conceive may be anſwered by the foreign Troops now in our Pay; and, ſhould any further Aſſiſtance to them be neceſſary, it will not only be cheaper and ſafer to us, but more advantageous and agreeable to thoſe Powers themſelves, that we ſhould furniſh our Quotas in Money, with which they may raiſe a greater Number of Men than we are obliged to ſupply.

5. Becauſe it has been undeniably proved, that this Method of Augmentation by new Corps, is by one third more expenſive, than that of adding private Men to Companies; the Expence of raiſing theſe 5705 amounting to *L.* 116,322 : 14 : 2, whereas 5780 raiſed by additional Men to Companies, with a Second Lieutenant to each Company, would have amounted but to *L.* 86,992, 15 *s.* which would be not only a preſent Saving of *L.* 29,329, but a future Saving of *L.* 10,134 *per annum* upon the Half-pay of the Officers of theſe ſeven Regiments, the few Officers taken out of the Half-pay only excepted: and think that, at a Time when the publick Expence

pence is ſo very conſiderable, the ſtricteſt OEconomy is requiſit, the better to enable a burthen'd and indebted Nation to continue thoſe Expences, that may be more neceſſary to be borne, than eaſy to be ſupplied. And as to the Advantage of the Service, the Facts plainly proved in the Debate, together with the Practice of moſt other Nations in *Europe*, and in particular of his Majeſty's Electoral Dominions, convince us, that, if this Augmentation was made by additional Men to Companies, with a proper Increaſe of Serjeants and Corporals, the military Service at leaſt, for which alone it ought to be intended, would be better carried on, than by the Method now to be purſued.

6. Becauſe Arguments drawn from the Uſage of *France*, we conceive, do not hold with relation to us; it being well known, that the Expence of 150,000 *French* Troops, do not amount to more than 50,000 *Engliſh*; that their Government, though once limited, is now abſolute and military; that the Poverty of their numerous Nobility, forces moſt of them into the Army, where the Court is glad to engage and keep them in dependence; and that no Danger can ariſe to that Conſtitution from the civil Influence which may attend ſuch an Eſtabliſhment, their Parliaments being only nominated by the Crown, and long ſince reduced,

ced, by miniſterial Arts, from their original Power and Dignity, to be no more than Courts of Juſtice and Revenue.

7. Becauſe we apprehend, that this Method of Augmentation by new Corps, may be attended with Conſequences fatal in Time to our Conſtitution, by increaſing the Number of Commiſſions, which may be diſpoſed of with regard to Parliamentary Influence only; and when we look back upon the Conduct of the Adminiſtration in relation to military Affairs, we have but too much reaſon to ſuſpect, that Parliamentary Conſiderations have of late been the principal Cauſes of Favour and Diſgrace. We have lately too ſeen new raiſed, raw and undiſciplin'd Regiments ſent abroad upon the moſt important Services; and others, ſeemingly much fitter for ſuch Services, peaceably encamped at home; for no other Reaſon, as is generally ſuppoſed, than the different Situations of the reſpective Officers of the ſeveral Corps: But this at leaſt is certain, that, in all the new raiſed Regiments ſent to America, there is but one ſingle Member of Parliament; which could hardly been the Caſe of any equal Number of Regiments in the whole Service. And what further induces us to entertain theſe Suſpicions is, that this Method of Augmentation, by one third the moſt expenſive, and by no means proved to be the moſt conducive to

the Service, ſhould be preferred at this Time, when OEconomy proportioned to the greatneſs of our Expences ſeems particularly requiſit, ſince the War, by your Inaction hitherto, and the Advantages given to the Enemy, may now probably be of long Duration, if not of doubtful Succeſs. Our Diſtruſt of the Motives of this Augmentation, which creates at once 370 Officers, which by the Removals in the Army may occaſion three times that Number of new Commiſſions, ought to be the greater, and our Care to prevent the ill Effects of it the more vigilant, ſo near the Election of a new Parliament; a Criſis, when any Increaſe of Influence gained to a Miniſter, may give a deciſive and incurable Wound to this Conſtitution. And we cannot forget, that an Augmentation of 8040 Men was likewiſe made the very Year of the Elections of the preſent Parliament; by bringing over Regiments from *Ireland*, and by additional Men to Corps in *Britain*; which, Time has ſince ſhewn, were never intended for foreign Service, though they were ſaid to be deſigned for the Preſervation of the Dominions of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, which we then lay under the ſame Engagements both of Intereſt and Treaties to defend. The Number of Officers in Parliament has gradually increaſed, and is now more conſiderable than ever; and though

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we think the Gentlemen of the Army as little liable to undue Influence as any other Body of Men, yet we think it would be very imprudent, to truſt the very Fundamentals of our Conſtitution, the Independency of Parliaments, to the uncertain Effects of miniſterial Favour or Reſentment: And as it is well known, that the four eldeſt Officers of the Army (the only Officers who have ſerved in any high Rank abroad) are now diſplaced, without any Crime having ever been alledged againſt them; we have great Cauſe to dread, that an Army thus circumſtanced, and thus influenced, would in each Capacity be fatal to our Liberties; ſince miniſterial Art in Parliaments can alone deſtroy the Eſſence of our Conſtitution, and open Violence alone, the Forms of it.

Ward	*Denbigh*	*Exeter*
Carliſle	*Briſtole*	*Thanet*
Abingdon	*Monjoy*	*Aylesford*
Cheſterfield	*Talbot*	*Halifax*
Buccleuch	*Weſtmorland*	*Greenwich*
Cobham	*Berkſhire*	*Falmouth*
Litchfield	*Beaufort*	*Macclesfield*
Bruce	*Maſham*	*Bedford*
Gower	*Haverſham*	*Shaftſbury*
Hereford	*Folly*	*Bridgwater*
Manſel	*Ker*	*Barburſt*